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This paper aims to critically investigate the liquidity risk management of Islamic banks and develop an alternative regulatory framework appropriate for liquidity management of these banks.

The specific risk profile of an Islamic bank requires developing a new and more efficient regulatory framework, which relies on risk- sharing and symmetric information among parties. The paper makes a differentiation between small local banks and internationally active Islamic banks and proposes to apply liquidity requirements only for internationally active Islamic banks.

A new proposal for the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) of Islamic banks is developed in this paper towards mitigating risks and concurrently protecting the interests of investment account holders. Minimum and maximum thresholds are proposed for each liquid asset in this new LCR framework. An alternative liquidity approach is discussed to complement the proposal and several policy options are suggested.

As participation banks are exposed to market liquidity and market risks, more high-quality liquid instruments within a risk-sharing regulatory framework may provide the inner adjustment process through which any mismatch regarding maturity, risk, value or linkage with the real economy is corrected systematically. It offers policy implications for regulators, supervisors and international organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the effects of liquidity regulations on Islamic banking using Turkey as a case study. It recommends an alternative mechanism using capital market standards for liquidity requirement of Islamic banks to mitigate certain risks.

The paper evaluates the correlation between cash and profit and between liquidity coverage ratio and capital adequacy ratio of participating banks in Turkey.

Islamic banks hold higher cash than they should. The paper suggests a maximum liquidity ratio for Islamic banks. Applying a cap to the liquidity coverage ratio will impose discipline on Islamic banks to manage their assets appropriately as well as to encourage their financial intermediation to the real sector. In addition, the authors argue that even if the cash outflows from investment account on the right side of Islamic banks’ balance sheets are included in the short-term projection, they should not be included in the denominator of the liquidity coverage ratio.

The current Basel requirements and Islamic Financial Services Board standards are disincentives to Islamic banks to provide risk-sharing or partnership-based investments and services to their customers and depositors. Effective legal and regulatory framework and supervisory oversight need to take into account the difference between the risk profile of a typical Islamic bank and a conventional bank.

Although it is well accepted that without adequate regulatory involvement it would not be possible to control and mitigate the risks related to Islamic banking financial intermediation, there should be a balance between the growth and stability of the industry. The regulatory involvement that satisfies this balance would be welcome.